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Need for Bipartisan Policy Affirmed

In the last few months, the foreign policy of the United States has been under fiercer political attack than in any period since the fight against the League of Nations in Woodrow Wilson's time. The attacks on the Truman-Acheson foreign policy are partisan. That is obvious. They have been spearheaded by various Republican Senators, notably Joseph R. McCarthy, Kenneth S. Wherry, Styles Bridges and Robert A. Taft. The attacks have centered on the contention that the State Department has pursued a "soft" policy toward communism in the Far East, failing to support Chiang Kai-shek and encouraging the expansion of Soviet influence. Some attacks have gone further, contending that Communists and pro-Communists in the Department are responsible for what are regarded as our failures in foreign policy.

China a Partisan Issue

Most of the accusations recently made against individuals may be brushed aside as sheer demagoguery unless evidence to support them is advanced. But the attack on our past and present policy in the Far East remains. It is important to see why this policy has come under such hostile scrutiny and also why it has become so partisan an issue.

Among many aspects, the most important by all odds is the fact that a great defeat was suffered by the United States in foreign policy—the rise of the Communists to power in China—while the mechanism of a bipartisan foreign policy was out of working order.

Although this was a coincidence, it is the fundamental thing which has made

the recent crisis in American foreign policy so grave—and so damaging to American prestige overseas. When 450 million Chinese were drawn into the Soviet orbit,

U.S. Policy Under Review

Current public discussion of American foreign policy has revealed great differences of opinion as to whether the United States committed errors in the past, and as to the course it should pursue in the future. The Foreign Policy Association has invited experts of differing points of view to present their conclusions on some of the major issues under discussion. The second of these articles appears in the adjoining columns.

the United States took its worst and most dramatic defeat in years.

A great many Americans promptly concluded, without much thought, that our defeat in China was the result of a mistaken policy towards China. We were not generous enough to Chiang; we were not resolute enough in our intervention on his behalf; we were too charitable in our appraisal of the Chinese Reds, too soft in facing Russia's pressures in the Far East—so the argument runs.

I cannot share this view. After granting that many mistakes of detail were made, I cannot find any reason to believe that a different American policy would have prevented the collapse of the Nationalists and the rise of the Communists. We could no more reverse the trend of a vast social revolution involving 450 million people than

we could have arrested the tide of revolution in Russia in 1918 by our intervention. Neither dollars nor bombs will dissipate the accumulated grievances of great population masses, once the dynamic forces of social change have gained momentum.

Nevertheless, the American defeat in the Far East was popularly traced to mistaken American policy. The next step was to find a scapegoat. This is where the hysteria that accompanies cold war played a part. After so many spy scares and some disclosures of unmistakably serious espionage, the charge of pro-Communist influence in the State Department was "a natural." It has won tremendous publicity for those who grasped political opportunity by the forelock.

Breakdown of Bipartisanship

But why did this become a partisan issue? It did so because the bipartisan approach had broken down many months earlier. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg's long illness removed from the scene the man who had made a bipartisan policy viable. The decision of John Foster Dulles last autumn to enter New York State politics by standing for election after his appointment to the Senate limited his usefulness to the State Department at the critical time, although only temporarily.

President Truman did not find alternative Republicans to consult on foreign policy—probably because he did not look for them. Secretary Acheson evidently did not realize that a foreign policy, however good intrinsically, is in practice no better than the political support it commands in the Senate. Truman and Acheson allowed

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the bipartisan technique to lapse just when a disastrous setback to the nation's foreign policy in the Far East was impending. Perhaps, in the smug overconfidence that followed an unexpected political victory in 1948, the President forgot that foreign policy, unlike other policy, must be made and supported by both parties in the unprecedented conditions of the mid-twentieth century. So 1949 brought the breakdown of bipartisanship, and 1950 ushered in its whirlwind of recriminations. Mr. Truman was like a man who let his accident insurance policy lapse the day before he was hit by a truck.

Repairing the Damage

Repair crews are now at work. The appointment of two very able Republicans, former Senators Dulles and John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, as top-echelon advisers, is a good beginning. The renewed consultation of the Secretary and the President with congressional leaders of both parties is another step of value. So is Senator Vandenberg's proposal to

create an "unpartisan" commission to plan future economic foreign policy. The bipartisan approach can be and doubtless will be restored by these and other means, although in the meantime grave damage has been done to the national interest.

The whole affair indicates how delicate and precarious is the structure of a bipartisan foreign policy. The door to trouble was left open by Mr. Truman's insouciance, and there were plenty of demagogues of the opposition to walk in and make political capital of what they found. In our political system eternal vigilance is required to keep any sector of national policy out of the rough-and-tumble of party politics.

Once the bipartisan pattern is restored, there will still be the question, how bipartisan can we get? Clearly the President cannot escape or even share his basic constitutional responsibility for the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. Nor can opposition leaders in Congress properly make an agreement not to criticize.

For the criticism of policy is their duty, as well as their right.

At best, the President (and his Secretary of State) can consult with leaders of both parties in advance of major decisions and keep such persons informed of foreign policy problems. He can see that the opposition party is represented in delegations to international conferences. But under our Constitution and party system, he cannot go much further. However, this sort of cooperative relationship ought to be enough, given a sense of responsibility in both parties and an informed public opinion, to prevent a recurrence of the sordid, low-level attacks on foreign policy and State Department personnel which in recent weeks have worked such havoc, to no good purpose.

WILLIAM H. HESSLER

(William H. Hessler, editorial writer and foreign news analyst of the *Cincinnati Enquirer* since 1930, has been identified throughout that period with the Cincinnati FPA, of which he is now president. Mr. Hessler is the author of *Operation Survival*, published in 1949 by Prentice-Hall.)

What Role Should U. S. Play in North Atlantic Defense?

WASHINGTON—The Departments of State and Defense remain hopeful that our European partners in the North Atlantic pact will, in time, follow American suggestions about implementing Article 3, which reads: "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

More Than Arms

Thus far, however, the participating nations have not fulfilled the assumptions which guided the administration in drafting the pact and its implementing legislation, the Military Assistance Program. First, they have yet to prepare a coherent scheme for immediate cooperation to repulse a military attack. Second, those nations still plan to maintain complete, balanced defense establishments on an individual basis, although Secretary of State Acheson told Senate committees last August 8 that henceforth each of the nations of Western Europe "will specialize in the kinds of forces and the production of weapons for which it is best suited and which will best fit into a pattern of integrated defense."

The Administration assumed that the gifts of arms authorized by the Military Assistance Program, which lately have begun to reach Europe, would, when augmented by later shipments, provide the foundation for military strength which the countries would then develop at their own expense. Yet, on April 1 at The Hague conference of the Defense Ministers of the pact partners, representatives of some European governments dropped hints that the United States should finance all rearmament programs adopted in support of Article 3. They hinted also that the United States should maintain a fighting force in readiness on the continent to defend Western Europe. The Administration had assumed originally that our military help to Europe in peacetime would be sufficient if it took the form of supply and counsel.

Spokesmen for the Administration made it clear to Congress last year that they did not expect the evolution of the pact partnership into a tightly-knit international military combination to occur swiftly. Secretary Acheson commented at the Senate hearings on August 8 that implementation of Article 3 "will require time, patience, and much hard work before it can be realized." Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson told the Senate on August

9 that the United States might have to carry on the MAP for four or five years. The Hague meeting, however, left American delegates with the thought that the United States might accelerate the evolution if it would take the counsel it had been giving to its partners.

U.S. Specialization

General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and a participant in The Hague discussions, voiced this thought on April 14 when he told the Executives Club in Chicago that "our own balance of United States forces—if we expand beyond the present levels—may have to give way to the theory of national specialization. . . . The North Atlantic Treaty defensive plans might require from us a greater air force, or a greater navy, than we ourselves would normally be willing to provide. With such an agreement, of course, a small bit of sovereignty is relinquished. But when I think that national pride and sovereignty are often paid for with the life and blood of soldiers, I feel that we must accept the more difficult alternative which comes with this joining of hands in collective defense."

General Bradley thus applied to the United States the observation which Sec-

retary Acheson made eight months ago with respect to the Europeans when he predicted that they would specialize in certain military branches and weapons. During the intervening period the United States has pursued one military policy at home as it tried to implant another policy abroad: at home, balance; abroad, specialization. No steps have been taken by either the Administration or Congress to substitute specialization for balance here, but the pattern for the future may be that if Article 3 is genuinely implemented, the United States will expect its European allies to supply the land forces while this country, in company with Britain, provides the sea and air power. But, some critics ask, is military specialization sound for the United States?

The principal barrier to the evolution of the North Atlantic alliance from a loose concert of nations to the joint proprietor-

ship of something roughly similar to a collective military force is the lack of sympathy among Europeans for the idea, popular in the United States, of integrating the nations of western and southern Europe.

Integration Problem

The basis of military power is economic strength. Secretary Johnson told the Senate last summer that the United States would ship capital goods to the partner countries in order to enable them to manufacture their own military supplies. The suggestion is heard here frequently, if unofficially, that the Marshall Plan will be succeeded after 1952 by an assistance program that will emphasize the export of goods useful to the development of a military economy. The basis of an integrated military force is an integrated international economy. But Europeans

have shown their opposition to nearly all undertakings in international economic collaboration. Paul G. Hoffman, Economic Cooperation Administrator, has as yet been unable to persuade all the Marshall Plan countries to accept a payments union. The parties to the Brussels Western Union treaty of April 17, 1948—Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg—have not acted on the economic clauses of that pact. The North Atlantic pact directly encourages the parties to engage in “economic collaboration” (Article 2), but so far the signatories have not taken this suggestion seriously. It becomes increasingly evident that before the various proposals for European cooperation can be transferred from blueprint to actuality, the United States will have to play a far more active role than the one for which it slated itself a year ago.

BLAIR BOLLES

U. S. Farm Surplus Calls for Long-Term Adjustment

With the outbreak of the second World War the whole farm policy of the United States, hitherto one of restricting output, had to be recast. The new aim was an expansion of production to the absolute maximum. President Roosevelt assured the farmer, who still remembered the aftermath of World War I, that “the post-war disaster of 1920 will not overtake him again.” In 1942 Congress passed the Steagall amendment which guaranteed price support at a high level on all important crops for at least two years after the war. The Steagall amendment was extended until October 1949 when the present law, the Anderson-Gore Act, was passed. This legislation guaranteed that prices on the basic crops would not be permitted to fall below a certain minimum, which was slightly higher than the levels written into the 1948 modification of the Steagall amendment. The new act does look forward, however, to reducing the support level by 1952. The law also provides for a system of production controls again, as in the AAA of 1933, on a voluntary basis. To prevent waste, perishables are to be made available at no charge, except for transport costs, to school lunch programs, public welfare agencies and private organizations ministering to the needs of the poor both in the United States and abroad.

How then did the situation get out of hand? Why does the government now need more money to build additional

warehouses to store surpluses newly purchased at high support prices.

Farm Problem Today

The surplus production can be explained partly by the usual post-war factors of reduced foreign demand and by the drop in domestic consumption occasioned by the return to normal peacetime incomes. A new element is the recent advance in scientific agriculture. With one-third less manpower than before the war, the farmer produces crops one-third bigger than the annual average for the period 1923-1932. The yield per acre today is 50 per cent greater than the yield twenty years ago, and land reclamation has been so successful that we have more arable land than formerly.

This, however, only explains why surpluses have arisen—but why has the CCC been unable to dispose of them? The Department of Agriculture has offered to give away to public welfare agencies huge stocks of surplus potatoes, powdered eggs, dried milk, butter and cheese. Despite these offers the situation remains critical. Food is a bulky item, and transport costs are considerable. Further, there is considerable farm opposition to a giveaway program based on the fear that such a policy might cut into normal commercial sales. Nor does the government relish the prospect of giving the surplus away—or of selling it below cost—because this would mean that a considerable

part of the funds tied up in the program would be definitely lost. Washington is still reluctant to concede that the support program entails substantial losses of public funds. Besides, to sell the produce at less than the support price is to negate completely the whole program. The government wants to keep these surpluses off the market in order to avert falling prices. But nature does not always cooperate, and recently about \$50 million worth of butter started to go bad and 50 million bushels of potatoes, just a fraction of the total surplus, started to decompose. On April 14 the government offered to give the butter away to public welfare agencies if it received assurance that the disposal would not interfere with normal sales.

As for the potatoes, Secretary of Agriculture Brannan decided on a plan of “secondary or inferior use.” The potatoes were dyed blue and sold to the farmers for use as fertilizers or livestock feed. The dyeing was to safeguard the potatoes from falling into the pot of the American housewife. The potatoes cost the CCC \$2 a hundredweight and are now going to the farmers at one cent a hundredweight. As far as foreign disposal is concerned, our support levels are higher than world prices, and it is impossible to liquidate the huge investment by sales abroad. The disparity is frequently so great, as in the case of the recent Canadian potato sales in the United States, that foreign suppliers can bring their wares

in over our not inconsiderable tariffs and still undercut our domestic prices. If the government tried to sell the potatoes abroad below cost, it would be accused by other nations of "dumping."

What to Do?

Is the situation hopeless? Can no more constructive suggestion be advanced than the present policy of ever filling an ever abnormal granary? The Brannan Plan, which involves a somewhat different approach, has met with nearly unanimous opposition. Secretary Brannan's scheme would permit farm prices to fall to their free market level and then would have the government pay the farmer the difference between the natural price and the support price. Its proponents claim that this technique would provide the best of all possible worlds. At one stroke the consumers would receive the benefit of lower prices and the farmer the benefit of supported prices. Opponents of the plan say its cost would be prohibitive. In 1949 the government spent \$80 million to hold egg prices at 45 cents a dozen. Under the Brannan Plan if eggs fell only slightly to, say, 42 cents a dozen the government would have to pay \$112 million to the farmers to make up for this three-cent fall—assuming that egg production remains at 3.75 billion dozens. Administration spokesmen would reply that it need not be quite so expensive, since the production payments are limited to each farmer's first \$25 thousand worth of produce. So far, opposition to the Brannan Plan has not given rise to any alternative program except continuation of the present policy.

One school of thought holds that the troublesome surplus is in our farm population. Advocates of this notion claim that by subsidies and supports we are permitting inefficient, unnecessary and submarginal producers to continue operation in the interests of maintaining the political stability associated with a large farm population, and because the problem of retraining and relocating a million farm families is too staggering to contemplate. Still others insist that the problem is overproduction of certain staple crops and the need is to alter the composition of farm production. Far more seri-

ous and sober investigations will have to be made before we are certain of the best solution. It is obvious by now, however, that the United States is confronted with a long-range problem, and it is doubtful whether a rapid and painless panacea can be devised.

HOWARD C. GARY

(The second of two articles on the agricultural surplus and foreign policy.)

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

BUFFALO, April 21-22, *Council of Branches and Affiliates* meetings

*CINCINNATI, April, 21, *Current Important Problems of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Hon. Philip C. Jessup

*NEW YORK, April 26, *What Should We Do in Asia?*, Off-the-Record Discussion

*ALBANY, April 27, *International Law and Atomic Warfare*, Telford Taylor

SPRINGFIELD, April 27, *What American Foreign Policy Means to You*, Thomas H. D. Mahoney

ST. PAUL, April 28, *Tito and the Cominform*, Joseph Korbel

*CLEVELAND, May 3, *What's Right With American Foreign Policy?*, James Warburg

*NEW YORK, May 3, *What Should We Do in Europe?*, Off-the-Record Discussion

*MILWAUKEE, May 5-6, *Regional Conference on U.S. Foreign Policy*, in cooperation with the Department of State

*Data taken from printed announcement.

Southern Asia and Point Four

What do Asian leaders think of Point Four? How do they themselves plan to develop the economies of their countries? READ:

PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN SOUTHERN ASIA: *From Pakistan to the Philippines*

by Daniel Thorner

April 15 issue

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News in the Making

ATLANTIC, INSTEAD OF EUROPEAN, UNION?: While Washington has been urging integration of Western Europe, French officials have stressed the urgent need of creating an "Atlantic High Council for Peace" that would represent the United States as well as Western European nations. This Council, to begin with, would coordinate trade and defense measures but might later deal also with the political problems of the North Atlantic pact coalition. Speaking at Lyon on April 16, French Premier Georges Bidault expressed the hope that the Foreign Ministers of the Western powers would discuss this proposal at their London conference on May 8.

ELECTIONS IN TURKEY: Turkey's second competitive elections for its 487-member National Assembly will be held in mid-May. If the dominant People's party government, which now holds 87 per cent of the seats, observes the new election law, the Democratic party is expected to increase its representation substantially, even if it does not win a majority.

GERMAN TRADE PROBLEM: As recovery proceeds, the geographic orientation of Germany's trade has become a controversial issue. American officials fear that renewal of German trade with the East, which before 1939 constituted 20 per cent of West German exports, may build up the Communist war potential. If Bonn is to forego this trade, it wants assurance that the United States will accept full responsibility for closing the gap in German commerce. Meanwhile, Washington is balking at Britain's attempt to include Western Germany in the sterling group.

INDIAN-PAKISTAN PEACE: If the agreement on minorities signed by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on April 8 receives support in both parliaments and is successfully implemented to protect the Hindu and Muslim minorities on either side of the border, it may prove the first step toward rapprochement between the two Commonwealth nations on economic differences and the Kashmir question.

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